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Even·NPIs in Questions·
Elena Guerzoni
MIT

1.

Introduction

It is well known that Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) like any, lift a finger and the faintest
idea, are grammatical in questions. However the class of NPIs appears to split into two
sub-varieties when their effect on the interpretation of questions is taken into account:
While questions with any and ever can he used as unbiased requests of information,
questions with so called 'minimizers', i.e. idioms like lift a finger and the faintest idea,
are always biased towards a negative answer (a problem first addressed in Ladusaw
1979). This paper presents an account of this rhetorical effect induced in yes-no questions
by minimizers.
The analysis I will propose elaborates on Ladusaw's original appeal to general
pragmatic principles linking the way a question is asked to the speaker's expectations
concerning its answer. Specifically, I show that the rhetorical effect of yIn questions with
minimizers is a consequence of presuppositions, which, in each utterance context, reduce
the set of possible answers for the speaker to the singleton containing the negative
answer. From the perspective of the hearer, the speaker's preference for a question
associated with presuppositions of this sort is a signal of her bias towards the negative
answer.
The distinctive property of minimizers that accounts for these presuppositions is,
as already proposed in Heim 1984, that minimizers contain a silent even, while any and
ever do not (contra Lee & Hom 1994). In other words, minimizers, but not any, are NPIs
• I am most gralefullo Danny Fox, Jon Gajewsky, Martin Hackl, Irene Heim, and Ulpal Labiri for
their generous comments and suggestions. My thanks also go to Klaus Abels. Sabine Iatridou and David
PeselSky and 10 the audience of NELS 32 for helpful discussion.
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of the Hindi variety, which also involve even plus an expression referring to a lower
scale-endpoint (see Lahiri 1998).1
One crucial ingredient of my proposal is Wilkinson's (1996) scope theory of
even. The present paper shows that, once the scope possibilities of even in a question are
taken into account, the bias follows from the semantics and pragmatics of questions.
This work reveals an additional advantage of this analysis in tenns of scope, i.e.
that it accounts, without any further stipulation, for certain otherwise unexpected
presuppositions of questions containing minimizers and more generally of questions
where even associates with the lower end-point of pragmatic scales (see Wilkinson 1996).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the relevant empirical facts.
Section 3 shows that the same bias of questions with minimizers is found in questions
where even associates with expressions denoting the lower end-points of the relevant
pragmatic scales. Section 4 illustrates how the presuppositions introduced by even in a
question relate to those introduced by this particle in declarative contexts. Interestingly,
when even associates with a scale lower end-point, the presupposition of the question is
the same as the one found in negative contexts, although no overt negation is present in
the question. In sections 5 and 6, I present my proposal. Specifically I will argue that an
analysis in tenns of scope predicts not only the bias of the questions under consideration,
but also the peculiar presuppositions they come with. What will make this unified
account available is that a simple and natural notion of possible answer to a question in a
context is restricted to those propositions whose presuppositions are satisfied in that
context. My concluding remarks will be in section 7.

2.

A Brief Survey of the Facts

Questions that contain any and ever (like la and Ib) can be used as neutral requests of
infonnation.
(I)

a. Did anybody call?
b. Has John ever been to Paris?

On the other hand, questions with minimizers corne with what has often been
described as a negative rhetorical flavor (Ladusaw 1979, Heim 1984, Wilkinson 1996,
Han 1997). Consider the examples in (2).
(2)

a. Did anyone lift a finger to help you?
b. Does John have the least bit 0/ taste?
c. Does Sue have the/aintest idea of how hard I'm working?

negative biased
negative biased
negative biased

In order to avoid confusion, a better qualification of these facts is needed at this point.
I

Importantly Lahiri points out that Hindj questions with NPIs are biased as well.
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It has recently become common practice to classify as 'rhetorical' those uses of
questions whose purpose is different from seeking information. Within this practice,
'negative rhetorical questions' are only those questions whose force is not of an
interrogative, but, for all intents and purposes, of a negative assertion (see, e.g., Progovac
1993, Han & Siegel 1996 and Han 1998).2
This notion of 'negative rhetorical question' does not suitably capture the
rhetorical effect of questions like those in (2), as the ~resence of minimizers does not
always prevent an information-seeking force alltogether.
Nonetheless, questions with minimizers are never neutral either. If not 'negative
rhetorical', the flavor they come with is that of 'negative bias'. In fact, to the extent that
these questions can be used to elicit information, they cannot be used to disinterestedly
do so (Ladusaw 1979, Ch. 8, p.188). The presence of minimizers is systematically felt to
signal the speaker's expectation (/bias) for a negative answer.
Borkin 1971 illustrates this point by showing that questions like those in (2) are
infelicitous in contexts where it is clear that the speaker is unbiased as for what the true
answer would be like. Notice that their counterparts with any are, instead, fine. (3)
illustrates this point.

(3)

Sue and I gave a party. Some friends had volunteered to help organize it. A few
would come with me to do the shopping, others perhaps were going to help Sue
cleaning the apartment. At the end of the party, / wanted to thank all those who
helped, but / didn't know who, if anybody, helped Sue in the apartment while /
was out. Therefore I asked Sue ....
a. Did anyone give you any help?
b. # Did anyone lift a finger to help you?

Given that judgments of this sort are quite solid, we can conclude that a
minimizer in a question obligatorily signals the speaker's expectation of a negative
answer, whether or not the question under consideration is also used to elicit information;
any and ever, on the other hand, do not generate this flavor.
This work attempts to make sense of this difference.

3.

Even in Questions

As mentioned above, my account of the bias of questions with minimizers will
exploit Heim's (1984) stipulation that these items involve a possibly hidden even.
Besides containing a covert even, minimizers like lift afinger clearly denote the low endpoint of the contextually relevant pragmatic scale (cf. Hom 1989,399).
Interestingly, the semantic effect of even in questions depends precisely on the
position of its focus on the contextually relevant scale. When the focus is the lower endpoint, the question has the same rhetorical flavor to it as questions with minimizers, when
it's the higher end-point the question is, instead, neutral.
2. However, notice that within the above mentioned previous tradition, i.e. in Borkin 1971,
Ladusaw 1979 among others, the classification as 'negative rhetorical' WO$ meant to merely indicate that
the questions under consideration are felt to be biased towards the negative answer.
J I'd like to thank Klaus Abels for pointing out to me the importance of this clarification.

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2002

3

North East Linguistics Society, Vol. 32 [2002], Art. 10

156

Elena Guerzoni

Consider. for example. a question like (4) uttered in a context where the relevant
alternatives to the focused element (add 1 to I) are various mathematical operations.
which can be ranked on a scale of 'difficulty'. On such a scale. add 1 to 1 is clearly the
lower end-point and the question is felt to be biased.
(4)

Can you even [add I to llc 7

negative biased

On the other hand. if the expression associated with even denotes the higher value on that
scale (as in 5). the question can be used as a disinterested request of information.
(5)

Can you even [solve this very difficult equationlc?

neutral

Finally. when the position of the focus of even on a scale is still to be determined.
the question is 'ambiguous' between a neutral and a biased reading. accordingly. This is
shown in (6). (6a) is a biased question. if the relevant pragmatic scale in the utterance
context is (6b). On the other hand. the same question is neutral. if Problem 2 is the higher
end-point of the contextually relevant scale. as in (6c).
(6)

a. Can Sue even solve [Problem 2]c7
b. < the most difficult problem. problem n..... Problem 2>
c. < Problem 2. problem n ......... the easiest problem>

ambiguous
negative biased
neutral

Notice that if we assume that minimizers involve a hidden even. the similarity
between questions involving them (repeated below) and questions where even associates
with the lower end-point of a scale. as in (4a) and (6b). is fully predicted.
(2)

a. Did anyone (even) lift a finger to help you?
negative biased
negative biased
b. Does John have (even) the least bit of taste?
c. Do you have (even) the faintest idea of how hard I'm working? negative biased

This is so because. as often pointed out. it is a property of the meaning of these idiomatic
expressions that they always occupy the lower point of their respective scales. For
example. in each context. the overt portion of lift a finger will denote the lowest value on
a scale where different actions are ranked with respect to how helpful they tum out to be
in that context.
(7)

< be the nwst helpful ....
do the dishes and carry all the shopping bags.
drive the car and open the door.
open the door.
lift a finger>

Given this. an account of the biased reading of questions like (4) with even will
automatically extend to the systematic bias of questions with minimizers like those in (2).
Sections 5 and 6 of this paper will propose such an account.
Before turning to this proposal. however. in the next section I will introduce into
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the discussion one further puzzling correlation between the position of the focus of even
on the relevant scale and the effect of even in a question.

4.

The Presuppositions of even in Questions

It is uncontroversial that even doesn't contribute to the truth-conditional aspect of

meaning. but introduces a presupposition. The goal of this section is to find out what
presuppositions are associated to a question when it contains even. Importantly, the result
will depend once more on the position of its focus on the relevant scale (a problem
previously addressed in Wilkinson 1996).
I will start by recalling some general known facts regarding even in declarative
contexts before turning to the more complex case of questions. In affirmative declarative
sentences the contribution of this focus particle is a 'scalar' presupposition (ScaiarP,
henceforth) (and an existential presupposition, which can be ignored here). Specifically,
(8a) asserts (8b) and presupposes (8c):
(8)

a. Mary can even answer [this difficult question]r.
b. Assertion (p): Mary can answer this difficult question.
c. ScalarP: For any salient alternative x to this difficult question, it is MORE
likely that M can answer x than that M can answer this difficult question i.e. I!.
is the LEAST likely among the alternatives.

Let us suppose, in absence of evidence to the contrary, that we can treat this scalar
presupposition as a logical presupposition. As a consequence, the function of even in a
declarative affirmative sentence like (8a) is to introduce partiality in meaning in the
following way:

According to this lexical entry, even is a two-place partial function that takes a
contextually salient set of alternative propositions (C) and a proposition (p) and returns
the same proposition just in case the following condition is satisfied: that p is the least
likely proposition among the alternatives in C.
When we tum to negative sentences, however, even appears to introduce a
different scalar presupposition. This is shown in (10).
(10)

a. Sue cannot even [add Ito Ilr
b. Assertion (not p): Sue cannot add I to I.
c. ScalarP: For any alternative x to 'adding I to I'. that Sue can do x is LESS
likely than that Sue can add 1 to 1. le. p is the MOST likely among the
alternatives!

Surprisingly, the presupposition even seems to trigger in (JOe) is that the
proposition in its second argument position (p) is the most likely, rather than the least
likely, among the alternatives; the opposite of what we just saw in (8). Since, as we will
see below, the choice between these two presuppositions is not always determined by the
• C is the set of contextually salient alternative propositions (see Rooth 1996).
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presence vs absence of an overt negation, it might be useful at this point to introduce two
abbreviations: In the remainder of this paper I will refer to presuppositions that are
typical of even in affirmative contexts (like (Bc» as hardP and to those that are typical of
negative contexts (toc), as easyP presuppositions.

hardP = p is the least likely proposition among the alternatives
easyP p is the most likely proposition among the alternatives.

=

As things stand, the meaning for even given in (9) above predicts presupposition
of the hardP kind, but doesn't suffice to account for easyP presuppositions. To resolve
this ambiguity, two proposals have been made that I will recall bere briefly.
K&P 1977 and Wilkinson 1996 suggest an analysis in terms of scope. Specifically
they explain the presupposition in (10) as a consequence of the scope of even with respect
to negation: if even has wide scope, our lexical entry in (9) captures this presupposition as
well. According to this view the LF for (10a) is (11a). The resulting presupposition (11 b)
is equivalent to (lOc).
(II)

a. LF: even [Sue cannot [add t Ito I]d
b. ScalarP: 'For every contextually relevant alternative x, that S canNOT do x is
MORE likely than that S canNOT add 1 to I, i.e. not p is the LEAST likely
among the alternatives ~ p is the MOST likely

Rooth 1985 proposes, instead, to stipulate a lexical ambiguity for even. According
to this proposal there is one even which introduces the presupposition in (9), and a second
even (evenNPI) which introduces the opposite presupposition. The distribution of this
second reading is confined to those contexts that typically license NPIs (negation,
questions, etc.).

(12)

[evenNPI D= AC<li~I>. AP<st>: 'I1q<.t>[qe C & q:fp -? q < likely pl. p
ScalarP: p is the MOST likely among the alternatives.

A detailed review of the arguments in favor and against each of these approaches
is well beyond the scope of this paper. In what follows, however, I will endorse the scope
theory, for reasons that will become clear at the end of this section.
We can now finally tum to our original question. What presuppositions does even
trigger in a question?
In interrogatives, the presupposition even introduces appears to depend on the
position of its focus on the contextually relevant scale. Specifically, each question with
even falls under one of the following three categories: when the focus of even is the
higher end-point, the question comes with a presupposition that is typical of affirmative
utterances (i.e. hardP); when the focus is the low end-point, the presupposition is the one
typically found in negative environments (easyP); finally, a question is 'ambiguous' if
the position of the focus of even on the relevant scale is still to be established: It can be
associated with a hardP or easyP presupposition, depending on the context.
An example of the first type is given in (13). The hardest problem is the higher
point on the scale of problems ranked by difficulty, and the question comes with a hardP
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presupposition.
(13)

a. Can Sue even solve [the hardest problem]r?
b. ScalarP: For any alternative problem x. it is MORE likely that S can solve x
than that she can solve the hardest problem.
o is the LEAST likely among the alternatives.
(hardP)

No matter which of the two theories for even one adopts. this presupposition is
expected. as there is no negation in (13a).
(14) shows a case of the second type: add one to one is the lower end-point of the
scale. thus the presupposition in this case is easyP.
(14)

a. Can Sue even [add I to l]r1
b. For any alternative x to 'adding I to I'. that Sue can do x is LESS likely than
that Sue can add I to I.
o is the MOST likely among the alternatives.
(easyP)

It·s worth noticing that Rooth's lexical ambiguity hypothesis can easily account
for the presence of an easyP presupposition in cases like (14a). This is so because. the
one even which triggers this presupposition (Le. 12 above), is expected to be licensed in
(14a). by whatever factor licenses NPls in questions. In addition. since the focus of even
is the lower end-point. the other reading of even. which generates a hardP presupposition
is pragmatically excluded. As we will see below, however. the ambiguity theory fails to
predict the systematic co-occurrence of easyP presuppositions with the 'negative bias
reading' of the question.
Finally. there is an ambiguity in (15a): This question can be associated with a
hardP or easyP presupposition. depending on what is the contextually relevant scale.
(15)

a. Can Sue even solve [Problem 21[?

ambiguous

b. < problem 2. problem 5, problem 3.... ,....... the easiest problem>
ScalarP: For any alternative x, it is MORE likely that S can solve x than that
Sue can solve Pr.2. 0 is the LEAST likely among the alternatives.
(hardP)
c. < the most difficult problem, problem 3, problem 5, ... , problem 2>
Scalar P: For any salient alternative x to Problem 2 it is LESS likely that Sue
can solve x than that Sue can solve Problem 2. I.e '0 is the MOST likely among
(easy P)
the alternatives.

Interim Summary:
In the last two sections, two aspects to the 'ambiguity' of questions with even emerged.
First, these questions can be neutral or biased. Second, they can be associated with the
presuppositions that are typical of affirmative or of negative sentences containing even.
In both cases, how the ambiguity is resolved depends on the position of the focus of even
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on the contextually salient pragmatic scale. Table I summarizes the relevant correlations.

Table]

Since in minimizers even associates to the lower end-point of a scale, a question
hosting one of these items will be a question of type A, in table I. The goal of this work is
to understand the bias readings of questions of this type. However, an analysis that
provides a unified explanation of both this rhetorical effect and of the unexpected
presupposition of these questions (i.e. easyP) is clearly to be preferred to any account of
only one of these two puzzling related phenomena. The remainder of this paper will show
that, of the two above mentioned theories of even, the scope theory proves more suitable
to the task: An explanation based on a single meaning for even (as in (9» and the
syntactic (scope) configurations in which it is interpreted accounts for both the presence
of easyP and its co-occurrence with the rhetorical flavor.

S. Scope Ambiguity of Questions with even
If the scope theory of even is correct, the differences in table 1 above should be
the effect of a scope ambiguity. In this section, I will begin by showing how, besides the
expected hardP presupposition, this hypothesis predicts the possibility of an easyP
presupposition in questions with even.
In confronting the task of deriving easyP presuppositions, we can start by
pointing out that easyP would be the presupposition of the negative answer, if even was
present in this answer and had wide scope over negation (the opposite scope relation
would generate instead hardP).s
(16)

a. Q: Can Sue even solve [Problem 2Jr
b. A: No, Sue cannot even solve [Problem 21f
c. LFl: even [NOT Mary can solve [Problem 21rl
ScalarP: not p is the LEAST likely among the alternatives
d. LF2: NOT even [Mary can solve II [Problem 21d
ScaiarP: p is the LEAST likely among the alternatives

(even>not)
¢:> easyP
(not>even)
¢:> hardP

'The careful reader has probably already noticed Ihat (l6b) doesn'l seem 10 have a reading where
negation has scope over even. The absence of this reading is due 10 the fact that English even is generally
infelicitous in the immediate scope of negation. a restriction that has often been attributed to a Posilive
Polarily nalure of even. Given this, an LF like (l6d) should be ruled out. Notice, however, that I will not
entertain the hypothesis that we can derive the above ambiguity between hardP and easyP presuppsotions in
(16,) from a scopal ambiguity of even in the answer (16b). Such a hypothesis of a scopally ambiguous
answer to a scopally unambiguous question would be per se implausible. Instead, the analysis that will be
presented below attribules the possibilily of the two presuppositions of (l6c) and (l6d) 10 • scope
ambiguity of even with respect to the trace of whether in the question. rather than relative to the negation in
tbe LFs of tbe answers. Therefore, the restrictions on the LF occurrences of the English lexical item even
under negation, that blocks (l6d), will not affect iL
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The task ahead of us consists in showing that the two different presuppositions. are
actually due to different scope options for even in the question (14a) itself. In other
words. the proposal is that questions involving even are scopally ambiguous; under one
reading they presuppose hardP, under the other they presuppose easyP.
In order to entertain this hypothesis we will need to make two assumptions here.
The first assumption is that a yIn question always involves a hidden whether. (previous
approaches based on this stipulation are Bennett 1977 and Higginbotham 1993).
In This paper I will take this silent whether to mirror other wh-words in its syntax
and semantics. Within a Karttunen-style semantics of wh-words. this amounts to saying
that whether denotes an existential quantifier.6 Differently from the garden variety whwords. however. whether quantifies over functions of type <st,S!>.7 and comes with an
implicit restrictor: the set containing the identity (Ap.p) and the negation (Ap. -p)
functions. This amounts to saying that whether means which of yes or no.
[whether 1I= U«s..,I>I>' 3h <sUI> [h = Ap.p or h = Ap.-p] and f (h)=l

g

In the syntax. whether moves over the set-creating Q morpheme. leaving a trace
of type <st.s!> in its base position. The resulting denotation for a yIn question will be a
Hamblin-set. namely the set containing the affirmative and the negative answer. It might
be useful to see how this works for a simple yIn question like (17a).
(17)

a. Did John leave?
b.
(p,-p)
~
Whether Af <st ,I> • ( f(p) }
~
(g(l) (p)}
~
Q [till' (p)= g(1) (p)
~
tl <s~,t>
John left

p=that John left

• For the present purposes, it would be equivalently fine to adopt a Grnenendijk and Stokhof
(G&S hem:eforth)-style semantics of questions. According to G&S 1989 wh-words are taken to denote sets
of individuals. For example which student denotes the set of students. Syntactically, wh-words always
undergo movement. within this theory as well. In the semantics, this movement operation creates a Aabstract that is composed with the denotation of the wh-pbrase via Predi<;ate Mndification (PM).
If we extend this to whether, it will be sufficient to stipUlate that whether denotes tbe set
containing the identity and negation truth-fum:tions (see (i». This phrase also moves leaving a !race of type
<t.l>.
(i)
[whether)= {1..l.t. A.t.t=O}

The semantics works as in the other cases: The movement operation creates a A,.. abstract over
<t,1> functions that is composed with the denotation of whether via PM. I will leave as an exercise to the
reader to verify that this option'makes exactly the same predictions for !he cases involving even as the
semantics and syntax adopted above.
1 The proposal that whether should denote a higher order quantifier of this kind is already in
Bennett !977. (Cf. also Krifka 1998).
'Compare with the Karttunen-sty!e meaning for woo: [whoJl= ij!Ihich person] = 1..P...,. 3", S.t. X
is a person and P(x)=!
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As shown in (l7b), the semantic composition proceeds in the usual manner. The
denotation of the proto-question (the phrase headed by the Q morpheme) contains the
variable over propositional functions, denoted by the trace of whether. At the next higher
node the A.-abstraction rule applies and binds this variable. Then, the resulting A.-abstract
is combined with the quantifier denoted by whether, by an application of the whquantification-rule (see Karttunen 1977). The output of this operation is a set of
propositions that contains, for each <st,s!> function in the restrictor of whether, the value
of this function applied to the proposition that John left. As there are only two of these
functions (identity and negation) the propositions in the set will be that John left and that
John didn 'tleave, as desired.
The second assumption needed for the present purposes is that even can have
narrow or wide scope relative to the trace of whether. This assumption is an implicit
consequence of endorsing a scope theory of even. The two LFs of (16) are, thus, (ISa)
and b.
(18)

a [Whether) [Q [t\ [even [Mary solved [Problem 21tl
b. [Whether) (Q [even [ t\ [Mary solved [Problem 21rl

As an effect of the presence of even, the elements of the set denoted by each of
these structures are partial propositions: Each proposition is defined only for those worlds
in which the presupposition introduced by even is satisfied. However, given that the
scope of even is different in the two structures, these presuppositions will be, in tum,
different. Specifically, those propositions in the two sets corresponding to the negative
answers are distinct partial propositions: the negative answer to (l8a) presupposes
hardP, while the negative answer to (l8b) presupposes easyP. Let's see how this
difference follows from a scope ambiguity of even relative to the trace of whether.
The semantic composition for (18a) is shown in (19a).9 (l9b) and c illustrate the
denotations and presuppositions of negative and affirmative answer to the question under
this reading.
{~venll(p), - ~venll(p)}
~
Whether
A.f<51.5I> {f (~ven 11 (p»)
~

(I9a)

Tracewhether>EVEN

{g(l)(~venll(p»)}

~
Q

g(I)~»

t)<s!.st>

~venll(p)

p=thatSuecansolvePr2

~
even
b. [no 11= -

~venll(that

Sue can solve Problem 2

Sue can solve Problem 2)

NOT > EVEN

9 Since the analysis is compatible with any current view on phenomena of association with focus.
to simplify matters a bit, I will leave out from the following structures the first argument of even, i.e. the set
of contextually relevant alternatives C, and assume, for the moment, that even is • partial identity function
over propositions.
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ScalaP: That Sue can solve Problem 2 is the LEAST likely proposition among
hardP
the relevant alternatives.
c. [yes] = [even](that Sue can solve Problem 2)
ScalaP: That Sue can solve Problem 2 is the LEAST likely proposition among
hardP
the relevant alternatives.
In (l9a) even composes directly with the proposition that Sue can solve Problem
2. Therefore the presupposition it induces will be that this proposition is the least likely
among the alternatives, no matter what value g(l) takes, i.e. no matter if we talk about the
negative or the positive answer.
(I9b) illustrates the semantic composition of (lSb), the structure where even has
wide scope with respect to the trace of whether.
(19b)

{(~ven](p), ~ven] -(p)}
~
Whether
A.f<sUI>. (~ven](f(p» I
~
(~ven]«gl) (p»)
~
Q ~ven]«gl) (p»

even

EVEN>Trace whe1her

~

[t,](p) p = that Sue can solve Pr2
~
Sue can solve Problem 2

b. [no]= ~ven] (-(p))
EVEN>NOT
ScalarP: The proposition that Sue can't solve Problem 2 is the least likely
¢:> easyP
among the alternatives.
c. [yes] = ~ven](that Sue can solve Problem 2)
ScalaP: That Sue can solve Problem 2 is the LEAST likely proposition among
hardP
the relevant alternatives.

In this case the argument of even (i.e. (gl) (p» contains the variable denoted by
the trace of whether. At the top node, after the application of the wh-quantification-rule
whether has been quantified-in and this variable is bound by this e)(istential quantifier;
the resulting denotation for the structure is the set containing two partial propositions
obtained by applying ~ven] to the value of the identity or of the negation function
applied in tum to p (i.e. that Mary can solve Problem 2):
(~ven](

lAp. p] (that Sue can solve Pr2», ~ven]([Ap. "1'] (that Sue can solve Pr2)))=
Sue can solve Pr2) , [even] -(That Sue can solve Pr2»)

(~ven](that

As a consequence, in the case of negation, since ~ven] applies to the already
negated proposition, the presupposition it induces will be of the esayP kind, i.e. that
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Mary cannot solve Problem 2 is the least likely proposition among the alternatives, thus
that that Mary can solve Problem 2 is the most likely, This is shown in (20).
(20)

lIeven] (That Sue can't solve Pr2)
is defined iff for every p in the set of relevant alternative propositions, p
>Iikely that sue canNOT solve Problem 2.
¢:>easyP
(ii)
if defined, ~venB(That Sue can't solve Pr2) = that Sue can't solve Pr2.

(i)

To sum up, a scope ambiguity of the sort postulated above for a question like
(16a), i.e. between the two LFs in (18), predicts the negative answers and the
presuppositions of these two LFs to be those in (21b) and c, respectively.
(21)

a. Can Sue even solve Problem 2?
b. no answer to (18a)= - ~ven] (that S. can solve Problem 2)
ScalarP: hardP
c. no answer to (l8b) = ~venB (that Sue can't solve Problem 2)
ScalarP: easyP

Interim Summary:
Recall that our goal in this section was to make sense of the intuition that when even
associates with the lower end-point of the relevant pragmatic scale in a question, the
question comes with an easyP presupposition. Let's see how far we got in accounting for
this phenomenon.
So far, I have merely shown how a scope theory of even predicts that one possible
answer to these questions under one of their two readings (even>tracewhethcr) is associated
to an easyP presupposition. Since the presupposition of the other possible answer and of
both answers under the other reading is hardP, this obviously doesn't suffice to account
for the intuition that the question as a whole unambiguously presupposes easYP.
In fact, following Bennett 1977, we can conceivably take a question denoting a
set of partial propositions to presuppose the disjunction of the presuppositions of these
propositions. Given this, as things stand right now, the above analysis still yields the
incorrect prediction that, no matter what is the position of the focused expression in the
relevant scale, a question with even can have one of two presuppositions: i. hardP, under
its surface scope reading and ii. hardP or easyP, under inverse scope of even with
respect to the trace of whether.
In order for an easyP presupposition to be the presupposition of a question with
even, one of the two readings (i.e. tracewhelh<r>even) and one of the answers to the other
reading (even>tracewhe,her) should be excluded, at the stage where the presupposition of
the whole question is determined. Section 6 shows that this is precisely what happens in
the cases where the focus of even is the lower end-point on the scale.
6,

Presuppositions and Possible Answers in a Given Context

In the previous section we saw that the Hamblin set of a question with even contains only
partial propositions, i.e. propositions whose felicity in a context will be restricted by the
presuppositions introduced by even. We can make some speculations about how this
affeCts the interpretation in a given context of a question containing even.
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I will follow a tradition started by Stalnaker and view the context as the set of
possible worlds in which all the propositions presupposed by the participants to a
conversation are true. Since answers with false presuppositions are presupposition
failures, it is reasonable to assume that a speaker uttering a question in a context c is
biased towards those answers whose presuppositions are true in all the worlds in c ('true
in c' henceforth). This section illustrates in more detail how this effect comes about.
Let's call Q/c the subset of the Hamlin set Q, containing only those possible
answers the speaker is presenting as live alternatives in a context c. i.e. the answers
whose presuppositions are true in c. (See Heim (2001).
On the one hand. when all the answers to a question have the same
presuppositions only two options are possible: Q/c can be identical to Q or empty. The
latter situation results in a presupposition failure. Consider the famous example in (22).
(22)

Have you stopped beating your wife?

If the utterance context is such that the hearer has never beaten his wife. Q/c is
empty and the question infelicitous. This is so because both its answers (and therefore the
question itself) presuppose a proposition that is not true in c.
On the other hand, in cases where different elments in the Hamblin-set Q have
different presuppositions. there will be also contexts (say C) where the set of possible
answers (Q/C) is a proper subset of Q. For example, if some possible answers to a
question presuppose P and others presuppose Q and if P is true in C. but Q is not. the
situation will be as follows:

P-answers= answers presupposing P
Q-answers= answers presupposing Q

=Q/C
o =Q
~

Given our considerations in the previous section. this is precisely the kind of
situation we expect to find when even occurs in a question. What I will show now is that.
in contexts of the sort just described, tbe question will come with a bias flavor towards
the P-answers.
Consider once more our question (16a), repeated below. The utterance context
has the important function of providing the information as to how high on a pragmatic
scale the denotation of the focused expression (Problem 2) is ranked with respect to the
relevant alternatives. The contexts that interest us. given our present purposes. are those
in which Problem 2 is very easy to solve. i.e. where Problem 2 denotes the lower endpoint of the scale (16b below).
( 16)

a. Can Mary solve even Problem 2?
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b. C:: < the most difficult problem •....•...•.. Problem 2 >

In a context of this sort. a hardP presupposition is false and an easyP one is true. thus
QIC contains only easyP·answers.

~

~
~

= QIC

D=Q

hardP-answers

This situation has two important consequences. The first consequence regards
reading (\8a) (trace wh..h ..> even) reoeated here as (23a\. Recall that under this reading
both answers to the question presuppose hardP. Therefore. this reading is absent in C
because all its answers presuppose hardP and therefore would be infelicitous in C. This
is shown in (23).
(23)

a IIWhether,Q tJ even M. solved [Pr21dI1l= (~venll(p). Since Yes presupposes hardP,lJyeslli! ~3all/C

~venll(p)}

Since No also presupposes hardP. If!Joll i! ~3alll C

~ 1fii3alJl C = i2i

The second consequence is that the set of those answers to the second reading (Le.
19b. repeated in 23b) that are possible according to the speaker's presuppositions. i.e. the
set ~3bll/C. contains only the negative answer. This is so because only this answer
comes with a presupposition that is true in C_
(23)

b. [Whether, Q even tl M. solved [Pr 2lrlll =(~venll(p). ~venll(-p)1
Since Yes presupposes hardP. lJyesll i! ~3blll C
Since No presupposes easyP.Jrnolle 1J.2J>1I1 C
~1fii3bDIC ={~venD(-plll

The conclusion is that. in contexts where even associates with the lower end-point
of the relevant scale. the question hosting it will be unambiguously interpreted under the
wide scope reading of even and only its negative answer will qualify as 'possible':
Answers/C
Yes
No

Trace

whether>

EVEN

EVEN

~

>

Trace

whether

(9

..j
Table 2

This accounts for both the puzzling phenomena related to questions of this type
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that were discussed in the previous sections.
First, we can now understand why a question containing even is felt to be biased
towards a negative answer, in contexts where the focus of even is the lowest scale endpoint. If the speaker decides to formulate a question in a way that, given the context,
excludes the possibility of an affirmative answer, he must be biased towards the negative
one. Second, as the singleton of the possible answers in these contexts contains the
answer presupposing easyP the question unambiguously presupposes easyP in them.
As mentioned above, the analysis presented here for questions with even extends
automatically to minimizers. Recall that these items involve a hidden even. In addition,
given their idiomatic nature, in every context, the overt portion involved in their structure
denotes the lower end-point of the relevant pragmatic scale. As a consequence, the
present proposal correctly predicts that these items will always enforce on questions a
negative bias effect.
Conclusions:
In this section we have seen how a scope theory of even provides a unified
account of both peculiar properties that questions with even exhibit in contexts where the
focus of even is the lower end point of the scale. Let's see how Rooth's lexical ambiguity
thesis copes with the same set of empirical observations. On the one hand, as noted
above, this thesis correctly predicts that these questions have an easyP presupposition.
On the other hand, however, it doesn't seem to make any prediction with respect to the
bias effect of these questions.
In the contexts we are considering, the hardP presupposition is infelicitous, while
the easyP presupposition is true. According the ambiguity view, this simply means that
the non-NPI meaning of even (in (9) above), which triggers hardP, is excluded; thus the
only possible reading is the NPI one (given in (12) above), which triggers easyP. The
choice of the NPI-even, which is licensed by whatever factor licenses NPIs in questions,
does not predict the affirmative answers to be infelicitous, thus the bias effect remains
unexplained.
Defenders of this view might object that this effect could be independent from the
presuppositions triggered by even. Instead, they might argue, it is due, to one of the two
following factors: the presence of an NPI (i.e. even NPI) or the presence of an expression
denoting the lower end-point of a pragmatic scale. Recall, however, that the occurrence
of an NPI in a question is not sufficient to force this effect: questions with any and ever
can be used to disinterestedly elicit information. 1O Nor does the presence of expressions
that contextually represent the lower end-point of a scale, by itself, account for the
rhetorical meaning of the questions under consideration. In fact, the same questions,
without even, when uttered in the same contexts are not biased. Compare the effect of
(24a) with that of (24b), in a context where the relevant pragmatic scale is (24c).
!O Notice that Han's 1998 explanation of the contrast between any/ever and minimizers in terms of
sterght does not seems to work either. She .dopts Weak aod Strong is ZWarlS' 1996 and proposes that
strong NPIs induce a bias effect in questions. Notice the, however, according to Zwarts' classification
Strong NPI should be ungrammatical in contexts like (i), While minimizers are not:
(14)
a. Less then 3 stodents lifted. finger to help.
h. At most three students contributed so much as a dime.
c. At most 2 people had the slightest idea about what was going on
In addition to this problem. it is not clear how their 'strength' should explain the bias flavor of questions
with minimizers.
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a. Can Sue even solve Problem 2?
b. Can Sue solve Problem 2?
c. <the most difficult problem, problem n, ... , Problem 2>

biased
unbiased

On the basis of these considerations. the conclusion we can draw is that the facts
discussed in this paper provide at least indirect empirical support for a scope theory of
even.
7,

Conclusions, Problems and Open Questions

This paper provided a unified perspective on two puzzling properties of questions with
minimizers and. more generally, of questions with even and a focused expression
denoting the lower point of the contextually salient pragmatic scale: A rhetorical effect
and an unusual presupposition. Adopting Heim's (1984) hypothesis that NPIs of the
above variety contain a hidden even, I argued that the two above properties follow from:
the scope theory of even and very natural and simple assumptions regarding what should
count as a possible answer in a context.
The above proposal makes. however. one. perhaps. undesirable prediction. The
prediction concerns contexts where the focus of even denotes the highest scale end-point.
(25)

a. Can Sue even solve Problem 2?
b. c:: < Problem 2, problem 5..... the easiest problem>

In contexts of this kind. the question should be ambiguous between a neutral
reading and a biased reading expressing the expectation of an affirmative answer. The
biased reading should emerge under the wide scope interpretation of even relative to the
trace of whether. Under this interpretation, the negative answer would come with an
easyP presupposition that is not true and would therefore be excluded (as shown in table
3). This would leave only the possibility of an afirmative answer. a siruation that should
yield an 'affrimative biased reading·.The latter reading. however. is not attested.
NOT> EVEN
Hard
HardP

A theory of movement based on economy considerations. like for example Fox
(2000), might provide an an understanding as to why in these cases the biased reading is
absent.
Recall that the only contribution of even is a preaupposition. Therefore, in the
spirit of a scope and economy theory of movement. movement of even should be licensed
only when it generates new presuppostions. Notice, however. that in contexts where
Problem 2 is very hard when compared to other contextually salient ones. the inverse
scope of a question like (25) comes with the same presupposition as its surface scope
reading: both ultimately presuppose hardP. This might be sufficient to prevent even from
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moving, as this operation would not generate presuppositions of the question that are not
already available before movement.
Before concluding, it's worth mentioning one more open question regarding the
movement even. The option of movement over the trace of whether, I stipulated in this
work, must evidently be excluded in the case of other scope bearing elements, e.g.
quantifiers. This is shown in (26).
(26)

a. Did everybody come?
b. " [whether. [Q[ II [everybody [camelllll
c. * [whether, [Q[ everybody [t,[came]]]lJ (neg. answer: Nobody came)

That a scope theory of even needs to assume that the movement of even is less
constrained than XP-movement operations of a more familiar type, is a criticism that has
often been brought into the debate by defenders of the alternative lexical ambiguity
view.(Defenses of this position can be found, e.g., in Rullmann 1997 and in Barker
Herburger 2001). Schwarz 2000 shows, however, that such an argument is not conclusive
since there is a set of facts (presented first in Heim 1984) that only a scope theory seems
to account for. The phenomena discussed in this work add one more case to Schwarz'
list.
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